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MAKING CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
LAW ENFORCEABLE: CLOSING THE 
INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE 
LOOPHOLE 
Over a span of seventy-five years Congress has struggled to 
protect the electoral process from the corrupting influence of 
large campaign contributions and expenditures. 1 These efforts 
culminated in 1971 with the passage of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act ("FECA"),2 the most comprehensive legislation to 
date regulating campaign spending. Ruling on the constitution-
ality of the Act in Buckley u. Valeo, 8 the Supreme Court upheld 
limits on contributions made by individuals and political com-
mittees directly to candidates, but struck down limits on ex-
penditures made independently of a specific candidate.• The 
1. For a brief history of federal election regulation, see Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 
821, 904 app. C (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam en bane), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The modern era of federal campaign reform began in 
1907 when Congress enacted the Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (repealed 
1909), which prohibited national banks and corporations chartered by Congress from 
making political contributions in any election. In 1910, Congress passed the first federal 
disclosure law, Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, §§ 5-6, 36 Stat. 822, 823 (repealed 1925). 
Eight years later, Congress made the offering of money to influence voting a criminal 
penalty. Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 187, 40 Stat. 1013 (repealed 1925). In 1925, these disclo-
sure requirements were incorporated and broadened by the Federal Corrupt Practices 
Act, 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (repealed 1972). The last major piece of 
campaign finance reform legislation to be passed before the early 1970's was the Hatch 
Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (current version in scattered sections of 1, 5, 18 U.S.C.), 
which banned overt political activity by all federal employees, except presidential 
appointees. 
2. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1976 
& Supp. IV 1980), and scattered sections of 18, 47 U.S.C.). 
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
4. Id. at 23-50. The Court upheld the following limits on individual campaign contri-
butions: a ceiling of $1000 on contributions to a specific candidate in a given campaign, 2 
U.S.C. § 44la(a)(l)(A) (1976); a maximum of $20,000 in donations to a political party in 
a given calendar year, id. § 441a(a)(l)(B); and a $25,000 cap on all contributions to can-
didates, parties, and committees in a calendar year, id. § 441a(a)(3). In addition, the 
Court upheld statutory provisions barring multicandidate committees, or political action 
committees ("PAC's"), from contributing more than $5000 to any candidate in an elec-
tion, id. § 441a(a)(2)(A), more than $15,000 to a national political party in a calendar 
year, id. § 44la(a)(2)(B), or more than $5,000 to any other political committee in a calen-
dar year, id. § 441a(a)(2)(C). The Buckley Court also upheld public financing and disclo-
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Court distinguished contributions from independent expendi-
tures on the basis that the latter did not involve "prearrange-
ment and coordination" between candidate and spender6 and 
thus did not pose a threat of corruption to the electoral process. 
Following Buckley, Congress amended the FECA to bring the 
Act within the standards established by the Court.6 The statute 
defines an "independent expenditure" as one "advocating the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made 
without cooperation or consultation with any candidate."7 Since 
the Buckley ruling, however, it has become increasingly appar-
ent that independent expenditures are being .used to circumvent 
contribution limits. The loophole has been made possible by the 
Buckley Court's failure to define the type of communication be-
tween candidate and spender needed to establish coordination. 
The Court held that coordination exists where the two parties 
communicate directly8 (actual coordination), but did not rule 
whether a finding of coordination was justified where coopera-
tion between an official campaign and a contributor occurs 
through indirect communication (effective coordination). This 
uncertainty over which acts constitute coordination has enabled 
wealthy individuals and political action committees ("PAC's") 
to make enormous contributions under the guise of "indepen-
dent expenditures."9 The result has been a torrent of political 
contributions that threatens the integrity of the electoral 
process.10 
sure limits while striking down limits on independent expenditures and expenditure ceil-
ings for candidates and parties. 424 U.S. at 143. 
5. 424 U.S. at 47. The terms "contribution" and "contributor," as used throughout 
· this Note, refer to a contribution or a person making a contribution to an official candi-
date's authorized campaign. The terms "independent expenditure" and "independent 
spender" refer to an expenditure or person making an expenditure which is independent 
of the official campaign; these terms, however, may include a contribution to an organi-
zation not affiliated with the official campaign whose purpose is to make independent 
expenditures. The term "expenditure" or "spender" is neutral, and refers neither to 
"contribution" nor "independent expenditure." 
6. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 
Stat. 475 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, 26 U.S.C.). 
7. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (Supp. IV 1980). 
8. See 424 U.S. at 46-47. 
9. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text. 
10. The dramatic rise in independent campaign spending by interest groups between 
t976 and 1980 demonstrates that independent expenditures are being used to exploit the 
loophole left by the Buckley Court with respect to. contribution limits. In 1980, interest 
groups and PAC's involved in electoral politics spent $16.1 million independently of can-
didates, campaign committees and party bodies, with $13.7 million of that total devoted 
to the presidential race. In contrast, 1976 independent campaign spending totalled one-
eighth of this amount. For a breakdown of these figures between parties and type of PAC 
involved, see Clymer, $10 Million Spent for Reagan in '80, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1981, § 
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The factual issues raised in Common Cause u. Schmitt11 illus-
trate the scope of the problem created by this ambiguity. In 
Schmitt, the court rejected two separate claims brought by the 
Federal Election Commission ("FEC") and Common Cause12 
against five political committees for violation of the statutory 
limit on expenditures that could be made by unauthorized polit-
ical committees on behalf of a publicly financed presidential 
candidate.13 In addition to the complaint filed against the com-
mittees, Common Cause alleged that the five committees had co-
ordinated activity with the Reagan campaign.14 No evidence was 
offered showing direct communication between the committees 
and the official campaign, but Common Cause did document a 
systematic pattern of informal links - achieved through net- · 
works of friends, shared consultants, and public press confer-
ences - which had permitted the committees and the campaign 
to work in concert without being subject to statutory limitations 
on expenditures. 16 The district court rejected this claim, ruling 
that Common Cause had failed to secure subject matter juris-
dicton. 16 The FEC, on the other hand, was still free to pursue 
enforcement on coordination grounds.17 While aware of the evi-
dence submitted by Common Cause, the Commission did not 
make a finding of coordination. The FEC's decision not to bring 
suit18 reflects the inadequacy of · the Buckley standards: by · 
neglecting to provide lower courts and the FEC with a clear defi-
nition of coordination, the Court has unwittingly permitted pre-
arranged activity to go unchecked if carried out clandestinely. 
1, at 33, col. 1. For figures on total spending (contributions and expenditures) in the 1980 
elections, see N.Y. Times, March 29, 1981, § 1, at 31, col. 1. 
11. 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 50 . 
U.S.L.W. 4168 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1982) (No. 80-847). 
12. Common Cause is a self-styled nonprofit, nonpartisan citizens' lobbying group 
based in Washington, D.C. 
13. See 26 U.S.C. § 9012(0 (1976). The court rejected these claims on the grounds 
that the limit was an unconstitutional infringement of first amendment rights under 
Buckley. 512 F. Supp. at 493. 
14. 512 F. Supp. at 501-03. Common Cause claimed that the coordinated activity vio-
lated provisions of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 
9003(b)(l)-(2), 9012(a)(l), 9012(b)(l) (1976). 
15. For a more thorough discussion of Schmitt, see infra notes 45-53 and accompany-
ing text. 
16. 512 F. Supp. at 501-02. 
17. Id. at 502. 
18. See id. at 502 n.54 ("The FEC contended . . . that its 'suit clearly differs from 
Common Cause's suit as the Commission's suit does not seek enforcement of the Act,' 
rather, it 'seek[s) only [a] declaratory judgment of the construction and constitutionality 
of 26 U.S.C. section 9012(0 pursuant to 26 U.S.C. section 90U(b)'. ") (quoting FEC Mo-
tion to Dismiss at 11 & n.8)). 
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This Note explores the problems posed by present attempts to 
define "coordination." Part I discusses generally the complexi-
ties of the coordination problem under Buckley, setting forth 
the rationale behind the Buckley rule and examining present ef-
forts by Congress and the FEC to enforce the Buckley stan-
dards. Part I concludes by proposing a new definition for "coor-
dination" designed to improve enforcement of the Buckley rule. 
Part II presents an alternative means for remedying the coordi-
nation problem. Rather than relying on a redefinition of coordi-
nation for proper enforcement of federal election law, this sec-
tion proposes prophylactic legislation designed to regulate in-
dependent spending for political advertising in the electronic 
media, an area of the electoral forum where coordination is most 
likely to occur. 
I. THE COORDINATION PROBLEM UNDER Buckley 
A. The Rationale Behind the Buckley Rule 
Prior to 1972, efforts to control campaign spending proved 
largely ineffective. Statutes banning contributions by corpora-
tions or labor unions and limiting annual expenditures from na-
tional political organizations were circumvented by political 
committees purporting to be independent of the candidate and 
his designated campaign committees.19 .The skyrocketing cost of 
federal election campaigns in the late 1960's20 finally prompted 
19. Shortly after the Hatch Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (current version at 
scattered sections of 1, 5, 18 U.S.C.), was passed, strict ceilings were imposed on contri-
butions by individuals and expenditures by national political committees, Act of July 19, 
1940, ch. 640, §§ 4, 6, 54 Stat. 767, 770, 772 (repealed 1948 & 1976). Total expenditures 
of political committees were limited to $3,000,000, and contributions to candidates or 
political committees were limited to $5000 in any calendar year. These limits were widely 
circumvented by a proliferation of political committees which openly supported candi-
dates and yet called themselves "independent." Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d at 852, 905 
n.1. The court of appeals in Buckley noted that circumvention of the statutory spending 
limits occurred through the proliferation of additional committees - not national politi-
cal committees - claiming to be "independent" and thus not subject to spending limits. 
See id. at 904 app. C. 
20. Studies by Herbert Alexander document the increasing costs of the political pro-
cess. See H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION (1979); H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN 
PouT1cs (1972); H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1964 ELECTION (1966). Total campaign 
spending on the national level increased from approximately $34.8 million in 1964, id. at 
13, to nearly $500 million in 1980, Smith, Financing Campaign '80: Would You Believe 
Half a Billion?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1980, § 4, at E3, col. 1. See generally COMMON 
CAUSE, How MONEY TALKS IN CONGRESS (1979). 
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Congress to initiate comprehensive measures aimed at correcting 
these widespread abuses. In 1971, Congress passed the FECA, 
which, in addition to imposing limits on campaign contributions 
by individuals and political committees, required the disclosure 
of all such contributions in excess of $10,21 and the publication 
of expenditures by candidates and political committees spending 
more than $1000 per year.22 After passage of the FECA, con-
cerns persisted that large independent spending by individuals 
and groups would create a loophole permitting circumvention of 
contribution limits.23 As a result, Congress imposed a $1000 ceil-
ing on independent expenditures made "relative to a clearly 
identified candidate."24 
In 1976, however, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo 
struck down these limits on independent expenditures as uncon-
stitutional infringements upon spenders' first amendment 
rights.211 Unlike the circuit court, which had concluded that the 
statute furthered the government's interest in eliminating cor-
ruption without unnecessarily encroaching on first amendment 
rights, 28 the Court reasoned that independent advocacy posed no 
21. FECA § 302(b), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, 12 (1972) (current version at 2 
U.S.C. § 432(b) (Supp. IV 1980)). 
22. Id. §§ 303-304, amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 
1979, §§ 103-104, 93 Stat. 1339, 1347-48 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 433-434 (Supp. 
IV 1980)). 
23. The FECA effectively closed the statutory loophole that allowed political commit-
tees to circumvent statutory ceilings on expenditures by describing themselves as "inde-
pendent." See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The loophole that concerned Con-
gress following passage of the FECA was related, but not identical to the loophole 
threatening these earlier election regulations; while the FECA did not allow a prolifera-
tion of so-called "independent" committees, it exempted independent expenditures from 
spending limits. See Buckley, 519 F.2d at 852-53. 
24. · Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, § lOl(a), Pub. L. No. 93-
443, 88 Stat. 1263, 1265 (repealed 1976). The 1974 amendments placed limits on contri-
butions, restricted the use of a candidate's personal or family funds, provided for public 
funding of presidential primary and general election campaigns, and established a Fed-
eral Election Commission to administer and enforce the FECA. FECA Amendments of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 
18, 26, 47 U.S.C.). 
25. See generally Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 
1976 SuP. CT. REv. 1; Comment, Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal 
Campaign Reform, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 852 (1976); Note, The Unconstitutionality of 
Limitations on Contributions to Political Committees in the 1976 Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments, 86 YALE L.J. 953 (1977). 
26. See 519 F.2d at 853 ("We hold that the limitation on expenditures relative to a 
clearly identified candidate is a necessary and constitutional means of closing a loophole 
that would otherwise destroy the effectiveness of other statutory provisions."). The court 
fully recognized that an expenditure might "obviously inure to the benefit of a candi-
date" even though the candidate was not in control of the expenditure or of "the goods 
or services purchased." Id. at 852-53; see also Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is 
Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976) (arguing that the ability to spend money is not 
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danger of "real or apparent corruption comparable to those 
identified with large campaign contributions."27 Limits on inde-
pendent spending, therefore, could not withstand strict scrutiny; 
'they burdened first amendment rights28 without serving a com-
pelling government interest. 29 
The Court's rejection of the loophole rationale for limiting in-
dependent spending turned on the assumption that only coordi-
nated or prearranged expenditures posed a threat of corruption 
to the electoral process. so Independent expenditures, ilo matter 
how large, by definition did not include coordinated or prear-
ranged expenditures and consequently posed no cfanger of cor-
ruption. If, on the other hand, an expenditure were not indepen-
dent - and thus "coordinated" - it would automatically be 
entitled to the same first amendment protections as conventional speech). 
27. 424 U.S. at 46. 
28. The Supreme Court in Buckley noted that expenditure limitations "operate in an 
area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." Id. at 14. Activities deserving 
of the broadest protection included the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people," id. (quoting Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)), and the making of "informed choices among candidates 
for office," 424 U.S. at 14-15. 
29. 424 U.S. at 51. The failure of the regulations to serve a compelling government 
interest was the primary factor motivating the Court's decision to strike down the limits 
on independent expenditures, but not the only one. The Court also cont:luded that limit-
ing independent expenditures involved a more serious abridgement of first amendment 
rights than did limits on contributions. The Court reasoned that a limitation on the 
amount any one person or group can contribute directly to a campaign involves only a 
marginal restriction on free speech. Under this view, the quantity of communication does 
not increase with the size of the contribution; instead, the "expression rests solely on the 
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing." Id. at 21. Independent expenditures, in 
contrast, do not involve individual spenders speaking through a second party. Restric-
tions on this type of expenditure directly limit the quantity of expression by reducing 
the number of issues discussed and the size of the audience reached. See id. at 18-21. 
In addition, the Court held that the limits were unconstitutionally underinclusive. In 
order to avoid vagueness, the Court construed the provision "to apply only to expendi-
tures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate." Id. at 44. This redefined standard, however, was flawed 
because it would permit "unscrupulous persons and organizations to expend unlimited 
sums of money in order to obtain improper influence over candidates for elective office." 
Id. at 45. Under the Court's analysis, therefore, the provision could not withstand strict 
scrutiny; limits on independent advocacy heavily burdened core first amendment rights 
without serving a compelling government interest. 
30. The Court reasoned: 
The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the 
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the 
candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a 
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate .... [Independent 
expenditures made totally independently of the candidate] may well provide lit-
tle assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counter-
productive. 
Id. at 47. 
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categorized as a "contribution," and fall within the sphere of 
campaign spending that Congress permissibly could limit with-
out impinging unduly upon first amendment rights. 31 In the 
Court's view, therefore, circumvention of contribution limits 
through the increased use of independent expenditures posed no 
danger to the electoral process because independent spending it-
self did not create a threat of corruption. 
The Court focused on actual coordination as the activity most 
likely to foster corruption. 32 The Court was concerned by the op-
_portunities for an exchange of promises accomplished through 
direct communication between candidate and spender.33 To 
avoid this kind of quid pro quo, the Court included expenditures 
evincing actual coordination within the category of "contribu-
tions" that could constitutionally be limited. The Court did not 
discuss, however, whether expenditures involving effective - as 
opposed to actual - coordination should also be treated as con-
tributions; nevertheless, it is clear from the Buckley Court's ra-
tionale that if effective coordination poses the same danger of 
corruption as actual coordination, expenditures involving effec-
tive coordination should be treated as contributions. 
In short, the Buckley Court had no intention of preventing 
limitations on expenditures that create a significant threat of 
corruption in the electoral process.34 If the term "coordination" 
is to distinguish independent expenditures from contributions, it 
must embrace all actions that could corrupt political campaigns; 
a narrow definition of "coordination" will undermine the Buck-
ley holding by permitting large contributions to be made in the 
guise of "independent expenditures."311 
31. Id. at 46-47. Under the rationale provided by the Court, any evidence of coordi-
nation increases the likelihood of a quid pro quo between candidate and "independent" 
spender. As long as a threat of corruption exists, limiting campaign expenditures serves a 
valid government interest. In the Court's view, expenditures involving coordination are 
indistinguishable from direct campaign contributions in both purpose and function and 
therefore should be treated identically. 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. See Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 323, 340-44 (contending that 
while the Buckley Court had no intention of striking down limits on expenditures posing 
a threat of corruption, its conclusion that independent expenditures posed no danger was 
incorrectly reasoned). But see Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and Its 
Prospects: The Constitutionality of Government Restraints on Political Campaign Fi· 
nancing, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1360 (1976) (arguing that, despite the threat of corrup• 
tion posed by effective coordination, limits on expenditures are not consistent with 
Buckley.) 
35. This Note will not attempt to debate the validity of the Supreme Court's deter-
mination that independent expenditures are less likely to promote corruption. Regard-
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B. Present Efforts to Define "Coordination" 
The Buckley Court failed to apprehend the difficulties in-
volved in distinguishing between independent expenditures and 
contributions on the basis of the presence or absence of "coordi-
nation. "36 Indeed, both the FEC and Congress have had only 
limited success in establishing a workable definition for "coordi-
nation" based on the Buckley guidelines. 
1. FEC regulations- Regulations promulgated by the FEC 
attempt to delineate the scope of political spending not subject 
to the limitations imposed by the FECA, in a manner consistent 
with Buckley. The regulations define an independent expendi-
ture as one "which is not made with the cooperation [ of] . . . or 
in consultation with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candi-
date,"37 and are based on the statutory definition that an expen-
less of whether independent expenditures inherently promote corruption, failure to de-
velop workable standards for applying the Buckley guidelines will allow circumvention of 
spending limits and increase the likelihood of corruption in the electoral process. 
Substantial reservations have been expressed, however, about the Court's conclusion 
that independent expenditures are inherently less corrupting than contributions. In 
Buckley, Justice White observed that regardless how broadly coordination is defined, the 
possibility for a quid pro quo remains: 
Let us suppose that each of two brothers spends $1 million on TV spot an-
nouncements that he has individually prepared and in which he appears, urging 
the election of the same named candidate in identical words. One brother has 
sought and obtained the approval of the candidate; the other has not. The for-
mer may validly be prosecuted under§ 608(e) ... [but) the latter may not, even 
though the candidate could scarcely help knowing about and appreciating the 
expensive favor. 
424 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, Profes-
sor Nicholson argues that independent expenditures can be used to generate a quid pro 
quo even when no "prearrangement" exists. The public's conception of corruption ex-
tends to "undue influence," which does not depend on the presence of "prearrange-
ment." Nicholson, supra note 34, at 340-42. Moreover, Nicholson notes, the Buckley 
Court's determination that expenditures are less effective than contributions in influenc-
ing the candidate, see 424 U.S. at 47, does not take into account the change in political 
realities since 1974. Today, PAC's and individual independent expenditures are the pri-
mary channel for money entering the political process. See Nicholson, supra note 34, at 
340-42; see also Adamany, PAC's and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 ARIZ. L. 
REv. 569, 601 (1980) (arguing that large independent expenditures give rise to the ap-
pearance of impropriety); Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 
345, 366-67 (1977) (concluding that the Court gave no adequate explanation for its re-
fusal to defer to the legislative determination that independent expenditures would be 
used for corrupt purposes once contribution limits were imposed). 
36. A few commentators recognized immediately after Buckley that by neglecting to 
define "coordination" the Court had created serious problems. See Clagett & Bolton, 
supra note 34, at 1360-61 (arguing that the "coordination problem" must be resolved on 
a case-by-case basis because present FEC regulations are "unworkable" and vague); see 
also Leventhal, supra note 35, at 366-79; Nicholson, supra note 34, at 340-42. 
37. 11 C.F.R. § 109.l(a) (1981). 
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diture "made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or con-
cert with . . . a candidate . . . shall be considered to be a 
contribution."38 These provisions thus implicitly define "coordi-
nation" by distinguishing between independent expenditures 
and contributions based on the degree of "cooperation" or "con-
sultation" between the spender and the candidate. Elsewhere, 
the regulations provide a more explicit definition of coordination 
as "[a]ny arrangement ... [b]ased on information about the 
candidate's plans, projects, or needs provided to the expending 
person by the candidate, or by the candidate's agents. "39 
The fatal flaw in these provisions lies in the ambiguity sur-
rounding the precise meaning of "coordination." While actual, 
overt coordination clearly falls within the FEC definition, it is 
uncertain whether effective coordination is encompassed as well. 
An independent spender who communicates directly with the 
candidate or campaign staff before making an expenditure un-
questionably has acted in "cooperation or consultation" within 
the meaning of the regulations.'0 Yet, "coorqination" can occur 
in many instances without such overt interaction between the 
contributor and the campaign. For example, candidates fre-
quently reveal their strategy at public press conferences or in 
newspaper articles. If a political committee or individual re-
sponds to this information by spending large sums in critical ar-
eas, the candidate is certain to learn of it. Such expenditures 
may in turn encourage the candidate to release campaign objec-
tives in greater detail at future press conferences in order to fos-
ter the efforts of these "independent" spenders.'1 The FEC reg-
ulations fail to indicate whether a PAC or an individual 
receiving information in this circuitous manner is acting 
"[b]ased on information about the candidate's plans ... pro-
vided ... by the candidate, or by the candidate's agents."'1 No 
direct contact has occurred, but the parties have communicated 
nonetheless. 
Similarly, by presuming coordination whenever an expendi-
ture is made "by or through" present or former officers of an 
authorized campaign committee,43 the FEC regulations address 
38. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1976). 
39. 11 C.F.R. § 109.l(b)(4)(i) (1981). 
40. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (Supp. IV 1980). 
41. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
42. 11 C.F.R. § 109.l(b)(4)(i)(A) (1981). 
43. Under the regulations, an expenditure will be presumed to be coordinated when: 
Made by or through any person who is, or has been, authorized to raise or ex-
pend funds, who is, or has been, an officer of an authorized committee, or who is, 
or has been, receiving any form of compensation or reimbursement from the can-
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situations where conspicuous ties exist between a candidate 
and a spender, but fail to confront the potential coordination 
problems where there are less manifest links. Thus, if a former 
official of an authorized campaign becomes heavily involved in 
the activities of an independent spender, the former campaign 
official's action will remain outside the literal scope of the FEC 
regulations, provided he advises the PAC informally or sits on 
the governing board without technically making an expenditure 
or allowing an expenditure to be made through him.'" 
2. The Schmitt case- The factual background of Common 
Cause v. Schmitt"!!, reveals more precisely the manner in which 
the "coordination" loophole is being exploited. Each of the 
PAC's sued by Common Cause employed primarily four differ-
ent means to communicate indirectly with the official Reagan 
campaign. First, several of the committees included individuals 
who were longstanding friends or who maintained working rela-
tionships with candidate Reagan and members of his staff. In 
several instances, committee members had served on the Repub-
lican National Committee or on the official committee of an ear-
lier Reagan campaign.'6 One committee chairman candidly re-
didate, the candidate's committee or agent. . . . 
Id. § 109.l(b)(4)(i)(B). 
44. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
45. 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam by an 
equally divided court, 50 U.S.L.W. 4168 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1982) (No. 80-847). The lower 
court in Schmitt never addressed the factual allegations presented in the complaint, be-
cause the disposition of the case turned upon the plaintiff's failure to establish subject-
matter jurisdiction. See 512 F. Supp. at 501-02; supra text accompanying notes 16-18. 
Nonetheless, this Note draws upon the facts giving rise to Schmitt because they are 
independently verifiable and clearly illustrative of effective coordination. 
46. Harrison Schmitt, chairman of the defendant Americans For Change ("AFC"), 
was a member of the Republican National Committee Advisory Council on Economic 
Affairs and a Reagan delegate to the 1980 Republican National Convention. REPUBLICAN 
NATIONAL COMMI'ITEE, ADVISORY COUNCILS CoMMl'ITEES DIRECTORY (July 1979) (on file 
with the Journal of Law Reform). Anna Chennault, a member of the AFC steering com-
mittee, was the co-chair of the Nationalities Division of the Reagan for President Com-
mittee, a member of the Republican National Committee Advisory Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs, and an ex-officio member of the Republican National Executive Committee. 
Wash. Post, June 6, 1980, at Al, col. 2, A3, col. 4; List of Officers, Executive Committee 
and Members of the Republican National Committee, June 12, 1980, at 2 (on file with 
the Journal of Law Reform); REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMl'ITEE, ADVISORY COUNCILS 
COMMI'ITEES DIRECTORY (July 1979). Stuart Spencer, who helped organize the defendant 
Americans for an Effective Presidency ("AEP") and served at one point as its director, 
eventually shifted to the official Reagan campaign. Spencer ran the Reagan campaigns 
for Governor of California in 1966 and 1970, and was the national political director for 
the official 1976 general election campaign for the Republican Party candidate. Reagan's 
Strategy, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1980, at 32; Ronald Reagan Up Close, NEWSWEEK, July 21, 
1980, at 39; S. BLUMENTHAL, THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN (1980). Thomas Reed, Chairman 
of the Expenditures Committee of AEP, was the chairman of the 1970 Reagan guberna-
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vealed the type of coordination generated by these informal 
links: "[because] the law forbids me to consult with [candidate 
Reagan] ... I've had to ... talk indirectly with [his campaign 
manager] and hope that he would pass [my thoughts] along ... 
and I think the messages have gotten through all right.""' 
Second, the official Reagan campaign and several of the com-
mittees shared the same campaign consultants and suppliers of 
campaign products.48 Political consultants"9 have a direct fi-
nancial stake in their client's success, and thus they are not 
likely to advise two clients having similar aims to act in a man-
ner contrary to a common goal. While no evidence directly im-
plicated these consultants in a "conspiracy" to coordinate ex-
penditures, the mere fact that they were employed both by the 
campaign and by the various committees may have made coordi-
nation unavoidable. 
Third, evidence suggested that several committees used the 
media to coordinate campaign strategy with the candidate. For 
example, on July 14, 1980, spokesmen for the official Reagan 
campaign publicly announced that "the South will be handled 
almost as a separate campaign .... [W]e plan to use a Southern 
strike force of surrogates . . . to take the battle to Carter's 
base .... "&° Following this pronouncement, in September 1980, 
the National Conservative Political Action Committee declared 
t 
torial reelection campaign, and was formerly a member of the Republican National Com-
mittee. FEC exhibit 13 to the Commission's rule 1-9(h) Statement, filed with the three-
judge court in Federal Election Commission v. Americans For Change, No. 80-1754 
(D.D.C. filed Aug. 4, 1980) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). Senator Jesse 
Helms, chief organizer of the North Carolina Congressional Club, was a delegate to the 
Republican National Convention and a close friend of Reagan. Wash. Post, July 17, 1980, 
at Dl, col. 1. 
47. Wash. Post, July 29, 1980, at Al0, col. 1 (remarks of Sen. Helms); ABC Broadcast 
of July 16, 1980, fro!!! the Republican National Convention (remarks of Sen. Helms). 
48. The polling and survey research firm of Arthur J. Finkelstein and Associates 
counseled three PAC's named as defendants in Schmitt - Fund for a Conservative Ma-
jority, North Carolina Congressional Club, and the National Conservative Political Ac-
tion Committee - as well as aiding the official Reagan campaign in both 1976 and 1980. 
Finkelstein himself was a member of the Advisory Committee on Campaign Services for 
the Republican National Committee, an authorized Reagan committee. See Affidavit of 
William E. Brock, III, Exhibit A, filed July 24, 1980, on behalf of Ronald Reagan and the 
Reagan For President General Election Committee, in Carter-Mondale Reelection Com-
mittee v. Federal Election Commission, No. 80-1842 (D.C. Cir.) (on file with the Journal 
of Law Reform). In addition, Bruce Eberle Associates, Inc., and Richard A. Viguerie 
Company, Inc., assisted several of the committees named in Schmitt in addition to ad-
vising the official Reagan campaign. Dionne, Small Gifts to Allow GOP to Outspend 
Foes in Fall, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1980, § 1, at 14, col. 3; Bait. Sun, June 6, 1980, at A4, 
col. 1. 
49. A "political consultant" is a paid public relations expert trained in direct-mail 
fund raising or newspaper, television, and radio advertising. 
50. Wall St. J., July 14, 1980, at 1, col. 1. 
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that starting September 29 and continuing through the election 
it would buy television time in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Florida for the purpose of broadcasting anti-Carter com-
mercials. 111 
Finally, indirect communication occurred through transmis-
sion of. materials prepared by candidate Reagan's staff. One 
newspaper report noted, for instance, that the Reagan campaign 
staff had provided one of the committees with a mailing list to 
carry out a direct-mail drive.'12 
These varied campaign abuses illustrated by the facts sur-
rounding Schmitt, 113 all examples of effective coordination, ap-
51. Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1980, at A3, col. 1. 
52. The fountainhead of Mr. Reagan's mail drive was a list of 180,000 names left 
over from his unsuccessful 1976 Presidential campaign. The list became the 
property of Citizens for the Republic, an organization started by Mr. Reagan 
and his aides as a fund-raising vehicle for conservative causes. The Citizens for 
the Republic's list, in turn, has been rented in a growing mailing-list market to a 
wide array of conservative groups, including the Fund for a Conservative 
Majority. 
N.Y. Times, June 30, 1980, at B13, col. 1. 
53. See infra notes 76-77 for additional examples of indirect communication alleged 
by Common Cause in Schmitt. 
The facts that gave rise to Schmitt do not provide the only example of abuses result-
ing from present efforts to define "coordination." In recent senatorial campaigns, several 
candidates' official committees sent prospectuses to PAC's discussing the elections gener-
ally and the opponents' strengths and weaknesses. For example, 2000 PAC "kits," com-
plete with information about the incumbent's political vulnerabilities, were employed 
extensively by the successful Iowa senatorial campaign of Charles Grassley in 1980. N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 8, 1980, at B6, col. 2. The Grassley campaign solicited nearly $500,000 in 
direct contributions from PAC's, which accounted for approximately 30% of the money 
raised by the campaign. The campaign designated one full-time staffer to act as liason 
with the PAC's. The stated purpose of the PAC "kits" was to solicit contributions from 
committees who had already given to the campa.ign but were still below the legal contri-
bution limit of $5000. The unstated effect, however, was to give PAC's interested in mak-
ing independent expenditures over and above the $5000 limit a detailed analysis of 
where their money would be best spent. Id. 
A literal reading of the FEC's definition of coordination does not cover this type of 
activity. Technically, these brochures do not constitute information "provided to the ex-
pending person by the ... candidate's agents with a view toward having an [indepen-
dent] expenditure made." 11 C.F.R. § 109.l(b)(4)(i)(A) (1981). Rather, this information 
was provided for the purpose of having contributions made. It would be difficult indeed 
to prove that a contributing PAC had used this information to make an independent 
expenditure at a later date. For additional discussion of the Grassley campaign, see 
Weinraub, Million-Dollar Drive Aims to Oust 5 Liberal Senators, N.Y. Times, March 
24, 1980, at B6, col. 3. 
Abuse of the independent expenditure loophole was not limited to the 1980 campaign. 
In 1976, the Ford campaign charged that Delegates for Reagan, a Texas group support-
ing candidate Reagan, was not independent of the official Reagan Texas campaign. The 
Ford campaign noted that the two groups shared offices and facilities, and that more 
than 20 members of the allegedly independent group were members of the official Texas 
Citizens for Reagan Committee. See H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION 518 
(1979). 
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pear to present the same threat of corruption to the electoral 
process as actual coordination involving direct communication 
between the contributor and the campaign.64 Regardless of 
whether it occurs with assistance from the news media, an old 
friend, or a political consultant, prearranged activity creates a 
danger that expenditures "will be given as a quid pro quo for 
improper commitments from the candidate."66 The Buckley 
Court stressed that only the "absence of prearrangement" 
removes the danger of corruption.118 Use of a third party to facil-
itate transfers of information between spenders and candidates 
does not strip the element of "prearrangement" from activity 
that would otherwise be considered coordinated and thus within 
the scope of FEC regulations. If, the ref ore, the Buckley distinc-
tion between contribution and independent expenditure is to be 
enforced, a more comprehensive definition of coordination is 
needed. 
C. Redefining "Coordination" 
The factual background of Schmitt makes clear that current 
FEC regulations do not address the entire range of problems 
contemplated by Buckley because they do not encompass in-
stances of indirect coordination. In order to avoid continued and 
flagrant circumvention of contribution limits,117 it is essential 
that new, workable guidelines be developed to enforce the Buck-
ley standards. 
In determining whether communication between candidates 
and independent spenders constitutes coordination for purposes 
54. It is unclear whether the Court foresaw the effective coordination problem when 
it handed down Buckley. Cf. supra note 36 (noting the difficulties arising from the 
Court's failure to define "coordination"). 
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. 
56. Id. 
57. See Weinraub, supra note 53, at B6, col. 3 (John Dolan, the chairman of the 
National Conservative Political Action Committee, "concede[d) that his efforts to unseat 
the five [liberal Senators were] rooted in a loophole created by the United States Su-
preme Court when it ruled in 1976 that independent groups could spend unlimited 
amounts on political causes, as long as they did not CQOrdinate their efforts with any 
candidate."). 
The uncertainty surrounding current interpretation of the Buckley standards has not 
only had the effect of permitting circumvention of contribution limits, hut in some in-
stances it has also had the effect of discouraging truly independent expenditures from 
ever being made. See H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION 364-65 (1979) (not-
ing that the Carter presidential campaign of 1976 was so concerned about the complexi-
ties of the FEC regulations that it established a policy of advising supporters not to 
make independent expenditures). 
376 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:2 
of the FECA, the FEC and the courts must be prepared to ex-
amine the intent behind campaign expenditures. Spenders' mo-
tives, however, often are not readily discernable. In some in-
stances, the spender may intend to make a truly independent 
expenditure, and evidence of indirect communication with the 
campaign is merely coincidental. Thus, an accurate evaluation of 
motive requires examination of the circumstances surrounding 
the expenditure. Only then will it become apparent whether the 
spender intends primarily to run a "shadow campaign" by 
clandestinely coordinating contributions with the candidate, or 
whether the spender seeks to engage in truly independent advo-
cacy. If the primary purpose is to make an independent expendi-
ture, then under the standards set forth in Buckley the expendi-
ture cannot be regulated without violating the first amendment. 
If, however, after careful examination it is clear that clandestine 
coordination has occurred, the expenditure should be treated as 
a contribution and made subject to the $1000 statutory limit. 
1. A proposed test- This Note proposes a seven-part test to 
distinguish expenditures involving effective coordination from 
truly independent campaign expenditures.118 The criteria set 
forth below establish guidelines to evaluate campaign spending 
in a manner that will simplify and standardize application of the 
Buckley standards. 
a. Indirect communications through the news media- Sys-
tematic use of the news media by the candidate or campaign 
staff to transmit messages to independent spenders poses the 
same danger of coordination or quid pro quo as direct communi-
cation. In Schmitt, for instance, statements made by campaign 
workers119 indicated that indirect communication through the 
media was used successfully to achieve coordination. 
Circumstantial evidence indicating indirect communication 
through the news media, however, cannot always be verified 
through other sources. Assuming that the definition of coordina-
tion is eventually made stricter to encompass information being 
58. To date, neither the FEC nor legal commentators have proposed a coherent test 
to be applied when determining if coordination is present. Several advisory opinions by 
the FEC offer guidance supplementing the regulations, but their scope is limited to par-
ticular fact situations. See Advisory Opinion 1979-80, FED. ELECTION CAMP. FIN. GumE 
(CCH) I! 5469 (Mar. 12, 1980); Response to Opinion Request No. 777 (FEC Dec. 7, 1976). 
59. In one instance, Kenneth F. Boehm, the treasurer of Fund for a Conservative 
Majority ("FCM"), declared that contact with Reagan officials was unnecessary because 
"we pretty much know what the campaign strategy is from the newspapers." N.Y. Times, 
June 30, 1980, at B13, col. 1; see also Boston Globe, May 28, 1980, at 1, col. 1 ("FCM has 
monitored the Reagan campaign closely; whenever he is in trouble or broke, they move 
in swiftly and skillfully."). 
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passed through the media, campaign officials will inevitably be-
come more careful about publicizing their intentions. Given the 
first amendment rights of candidates to make campaign strate-
gies public, and given that all potential independent spenders 
have access to information that is broadcast in addition to their 
own right to publicize "campaign strategies," determining 
whether "independent" spenders have used the media for pur-
poses of coordination becomes a complex proposition. 60 One an-
swer to this problem is to require that there be evidence of sys-
tematic exploitation of the news media for purposes of 
communication and coordination.61 This requirement ensures 
that only those candidates and spenders intending to coordinate 
would suffer curtailment of their first amendment rights. While 
an isolated coincidence could occur indicating communication 
between a campaign and a spender, it is unlikely that a pattern 
of expenditures involving indirect communication through the 
media could be established unless the candidate were actually 
attempting to achieve coordination.62 
b. Shared consultants- Political consultants are not disin-
terested parties; they have a financial interest in seeing that 
their candidate prevails. A consultant seems likely, therefore, to 
serve as a conduit for coordinating expenditures between the 
"independent" spender and the official campaign.63 Thus, the 
sharing of consultants by spenders and candidates suggests coor-
dination. This element of the proposed test draws support from 
a general proposition contained within the FEC regulations; the 
Commission has indicated that a presumption of coordination 
between a political committee and the official campaign will be 
established where the "two entities consistently purchase goods 
60. Moreover, allowing evidence of indirect communication through the news media 
to establish a presumption of coordination may have a chilling effect on the first amend-
ment rights of the candidate and campaign staff. A candidate might feel compelled to 
curtail his interactions with the press if the danger existed that such activity could be · 
used to establish coordination. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (vague 
statutory standards may cause the speaker to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" than 
he otherwise would). 
61. "Systematic exploitation" refers to methodical, thorough, or regular use of the 
news media to publicize campaign strategy or other potentially valuable information. 
The inquiry should focus upon patterns of activity not normally seen in the typical oper-
ations of a PAC or individual independent spender. 
62. If, for example, a PAC repeatedly engages in a flurry of activity in particular 
regions of the country immediately after an official campaign has publicly declared it 
needs help in those areas, a presumption of coordination .would be permissible, see infra 
notes 79-84 and accompanying text. An isolated episode would not be sufficient to estab-
lish intent to coordinate. 
63. The FEC's general counsel supports this conclusion. See Advisory Opinion 1979-
80, FED. ELECTION CAMP. FIN. GumE (CCH) 11 5469, at 10,525 (Mar. 12, 1980). 
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and services from common sources. "64 
c. Use of materials provided by the candidate- FEC regula-
tions state that financing the dissemination, distribution, or re-
publication of campaign materials prepared by the candidate 
shall be considered a contribution for the purpose of contribu-
tion limits.611 The regulations, however, do not cover situations 
where materials furnished by a candidate or campaign staff are 
used by a political committee or individual to plan strategy but 
are not disseminated or republished. 
It is unlikely that material prepared by the candidate would 
fall into the hands of an independent advocate unless some de-
gree of coordination were involved.66 Thus, material provided to 
independent spenders by candidates should be considered an in-
dicium of indirect communication. In Schmitt, for example, a 
mailing list that mysteriously found its way into the possession 
of one of the defendant committees was later discovered to have 
been rented from· an organization started by candidate Reagan 
and his aides. 67 
d. Membership- Longstanding friendships and working rela-
tionships are a primary means for achieving clandestine coordi-
nation. Prior collaborations88 with any authorized committee69 of 
the candidate - in past as well as present election years - by 
an individual currently working for or advising an "indepen-
dent" political committee suggest a lack of independence. The 
same holds true for expenditures made by an individual on his 
own who has worked for an authorized committee of the candi-
date in a prior campaign. Similarly, if a former staff member of 
the official campaign makes substantial expenditures, the cir-
cumstances on their face indicate that the expenditures are be-
64. FEC General Counsel's Report in the Matter of ACU/CVF 5-6 (Nov. 11, 1977). 
65. 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(5)(d)(l) (1981). 
66. In the situation discussed supra at note 52 and accompanying text, the circum-
stances indicated that the official Reagan campaign fully· intended to lease the mailing 
list to an array of conservative groups. Had the official campaign been able to demon-
strate that they knew nothing about the whereabouts of the mailing list, a presumption 
of coordination would have been successfully rebutted, see infra notes 79-84 and accom-
panying text. 
67. See supra note 52. 
68. The term "prior collaborations" should be interpreted broadly to include any for-
mer ties with an authorized campaign. The fact that an individual was not an officer of 
the authorized committee, or did not receive compensation from the candidate, should 
not preclude the trier of fact from considering the individual's former ties with the cam-
paign. Cf. supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of the 
FEC's definition of coordination in 11 C.F.R. 109.l(b)(4)(i)(B) (1981)). 
69. The term "authorized committee" includes the official national committee of the · 
candidate's party. 
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ing made "based on information provided by the candidate. "70 
It may be difficult, however, to prevent political committee 
members from talking informally with former members of au-
thorized campaigns or close friends of the candidate.71 Under 
this aspect of the proposed test, vexing problems arise in deter-
mining whether a PAC has engaged in coordination by consult-
ing former colleagues on an ex-officio basis. An inability to pre-
vent all potential coordination, however, does not justify 
foresaking remedial measures altogether. 
e. Size of expenditure and organization- Before coordina-
tion can occur, the candidate must be aware of the activities 
planned by the spender on behalf of the campaign. It is highly 
unlikely that a shrewd candidate will not take careful notice of a 
PAC or individual offering large financial resources to support 
the official campaign. Thus, because large expenditures increase 
the likelihood that the contacts needed to establish coordination 
have occurred, they can be taken as indicative of indirect 
communication. 72 
The Schmitt case presents an obvious example of size influ-
. encing the potential for coordination. The five defendant politi-
cal committees in Schmitt had pledged to raise $57 million for 
expenditures on behalf of the Reagan campaign.73 After the Re-
70. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.l(b)(4)(i) (1981). In a 1976 advisory opinion, the FEC ruled 
that a volunteer worker in Gerald Ford's presidential primary campaign could not leave 
the campaign to form a political committee to make "independent expenditures": "In 
the view of a majority of the Commissioners, contacts with campaign personnel and re-
ceiving information and knowledge of campaign plans or needs, were inevitable." Re-
sponse to Opinion Request No. 777 (FEC Dec. 7, 1976). Thus, the Commission concluded 
that the presumption of coordination could not be rebutted. 
•· 71. See ·Clagett & Bolton, supra note 34, at 1361-62 (arguing that candidates and 
campaign officials should be protected by the first amendment from government regula-
tions which restrict their ability to enunciate campaign strategies at press conferences 
and informally with friends). 
72. This criterion precludes the candidate from denying coordination on the grounds 
of "ignorance of the spender's activities," unless he can come forward with evidence sup-
porting his position. 
73. Americans for Change intended to raise between $20 and 30 million through na-
tionwide solicitations of contributions in order to purchase large amounts of radio and 
television time for the purpose of running professionally prepared advertisements. Wash. 
Post, June 6, 1980, at Al, col. 2; Bait. Sun, June 6, 1980, at A4, col. 1. Americans for an 
Effective Presidency intended to raise $3 to 8 million for similar purposes. Hornblower, 
Gold-Plated Panel Set to Raise, Spend Millions For Reagan, Wash. Post, July 10, 1980, 
at A3, col. 1. The third committee, Fund for a Conservative Majority, expected to raise 
between $3 and 10 million for advertising. Wash. Star, June 2, 1980, at Al, col. 1. The 
North Carolina Congressional Club sought to raise up to $4 million for the purchase of 
radio and television time. N. Y. Times, July 15, 1980, at B9, col. 2. The National Con-
servative Political Action Committee intended to raise between $1 and 5 million for the 
purpose of running advertisements opposing President Carter and supporting candidate 
Reagan. Id. 
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publican National Convention, candidate Reagan opted to re-
ceive $29.4 million in public financing for his general election 
campaign, thereby incurring the legal obligation to limit his 
campaign expenditures to the amount of the grant.74 Given this 
limitation, the combined expenditures by the five committees 
sued in Schmitt represented 158 % of the Reagan budget. The 
extraordinary financial clout of these committees relative to the 
official Reagan campaign increased the likelihood that the cam-
paign carefully monitored their activities and encouraged coordi-
nation whenever possible. 711 
f. Content of campaign literature- The content of campaign 
literature distributed by a PAC can be a useful indication of in-
tent to circumvent contribution limits. In Schmitt, for example, 
one of the defendant committees disseminated brochures mak-
ing its intentions plain: "Although Ronald Reagan will be lim-
ited in spending this fall by federal law, you and I can help him 
overcome the odds - [We] can spend an unlimited amount of 
money on [his behalf]."78 Nevertheless, it is difficult to infer 
from the content of the literature whether coordination has ac-
tually occurred. Written or spoken intentions therefore should 
only be considered as suggestive of coordination; taken alone 
they count for little when no other evidence exists that coordina-
The five committees did not succeed, however, in raising the full amount they ex-
pected. Actual independent expenditures by all PAC's in 1980 were far less than $57 
million. See supra note 10. 
74. See 26 U.S.C. § 9012(0 (1976). 
75. Similarly, the Grassley senatorial campaign in Iowa was well aware of the effec-
tiveness of PAC expenditures. See supra note 53. 
76. FEC exhibit 17 to the Commission's rule 1-9(h) Statement, filed with the three-
judge court in Federal Election Commission v. Americans for Change, No. 80-1754 
(D.D.C. filed Aug. 4, 1980) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). Americans for 
Change distributed literature stating: "The federal law prohibits you from contributing 
directly to the Reagan general election campaign and limits the amount of funds that he 
can spend on voter educational material." FEC exhibit 4 to the Commission's rule 1-9(h) 
Statement, supra (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
Reagan for President in '80' is being sponsored by Americans For Change, be-
cause federal campaign financing laws prohibit national candidates from ac-
cepting personal contributions since they receive federal funds. If you want to 
see a change in this nation in 1980 it's going to take much more than the $29 
million that the federal government is allowing Ronald Reagan. 
FEC exhibit 2 to the Commission's rule 1-9(h) Statement, supra (on file with the Jour-
nal of Law Reform). 
The literature also indicated that the Reagan campaign was well aware that the com-
mittees were engaged in shadow campaigns on its .behalf. In one instance, the National 
Conservative Political Action Committee urged contributors to inform .. the official Rea-
gan campaign of their support: "If you can send a contribution to NCPAC to help us 
help Governor Reagan, I am also asking you to send him the enclosed postcard telling 
him of your support." FEC Exhibit 21 to the Commission's rule 1-9(h) Statement, supra 
(on file with the Journal of Law Reform). · 
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tion has actually occurred. 
g. Use of the candidate's name- In several instances, politi-
cal committees have attempted to benefit from the aura of legiti-
macy created by adopting the candidate's name. 77 An official 
campaign that fails to disavow this use of the candidate's name 
has conferred special status upon the spender, and thus would 
be likely to monitor that spender's activities. As with a PAC of-
fering sizeable financial backing to a campaign, the initial 
groundwork needed to establish coordination may well have oc-
curred where a committee is authorized to use the candidate's 
name.78 
2. Applying the seven-part test- Each factor of the pro-
posed test should not be accorded equal weight when determin-
ing whether coordination has occurred. Any one of the first three 
criteria - concerned with indirect communication between 
spender and candidate through the media, political consultants 
common to both the spender and the campaign, and material 
furnished to the contributor by the candidate - should be suffi-
cient to establish a "rebuttable presumption of fact"79 that the 
candidate and the spender have engaged in coordinated activity. 
Presentation of evidence tending to prove _any one of these fac-
77. Several of the political committees made use of the candidate's name to create 
the appearance that their activities were authorized by the official campaign. See FEC 
Exhibits 2, 10 & 18 to the Commission's rule 1-9(h) Statement, supra note 76 (on file 
with the Journal of Law Reform). It is likely that the official Reagan campaign would 
watch carefully over any organization which appropriated its name. The potential for. 
harm to a campaign from an irresponsible group is considerable; a campaign's decision 
not to disavow PAC activities suggests that it has concluded the PAC is beneficial to the 
overall effort. 
As a general matter, disavowal of intent or knowledge of prearrangement is not a for-
mal element of the proposed test. Few candidates will refuse to disavow knowledge. Re-
quiring disavowal, therefore, has little probative value. Nevertheless, a failure by the 
official campaign to make a public disavowal if requested to do so could be used to sup-
port a finding of coordination. Discouraging the use of official names, however, may have 
undesirable consequences. See Adamany, supra note 35, at 601-02 (arguing that PAC's 
frequently use unrevealing names - e.g., "Citizens for Good Government" - in order to 
disguise the true origins of independent expenditures). 
78. See supra note 77. Both Congress and the FEC have recognized that use of the 
candidate's name indicates that the organization using it is one that the candidate has 
authorized. See H.R. REP. No. 422, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Coos 
CONG. & Ao. NEws· 2860, 2873; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 19 n.21, Federal Election Commission v. 
Americans for Change, No. 80-1754 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 4, 1980); see also 2 U.S.C. § 
432(e)(4) (Supp. IV 1980). 
79. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.9 (2d ed. 1977). "Rebuttable 
presumptions of fact" are to be distinguished from "conclusive presumptions." A "rebut-
table presumption" is a procedural device for allocating the production burden. Id. § 7.9, 
at 256. "The conclusive presumption is not really a procedural device at all. Rather it is a 
process of concealing by fiction a change in the substantive law." Id. § 7.9, at 253. 
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tors renders the likelihood of prearranged expenditures so great 
that it is "sensible and time-saving" to presume that coordina-
tion exists unless the individual spender or PAC proves other-
wise. 80 The rebuttable presumption does not shift the ultimate 
burden of persuasion to the independent advocate; it merely 
shifts the burden of coming forward with probative evidence. 
Once parties present evidence to rebut the charge of coordi-
nated activity, the presumption disappears and has no further 
effect on the outcome.81 If, however, the PAC or individual 
spender fails to meet the burden of production, coordination will 
be established conclusively.82 No amount of evidence tending to 
disprove the existence of any of the other six factors will alter 
this· conclusion. 
The remaining four criteria - focusing on the membership of 
the PAC, the level of expenditures, the content of a committee's 
campaign literature, and the use of the candidate's name - are 
of lesser importance and should not be held sufficient to create a 
rebuttable presumption of coordination. Each of these factors 
considered singly could reasonably reflect the typical operations 
of a PAC or individual spender. Thus, to avoid finding coordina-
tion where the pattern of activity reflects mere unintended par-
allelism and not prearrangement, these lesser factors should be 
considered insufficient to establish a presumption of coordina-
tion. Evidence tending to prove a combination of these factors, 
however, may be indicative of a general intent to coordinate. In 
this instance, it remains for the trier of fact to assess the totality 
of the evidence before reaching a conclusion. 83 
Dividing the seven factors into presumptive and non-pre-
sumptive categories will not unfairly condemn the well-inten-
tioned spender who, as a matter of coincidence, appears on the 
basis of one or two factors to have engaged in coordination. If 
the coincidental activities fall within the category of factors not 
accorded presumptive weight because they are more common to 
80. See McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 343, at 807 (E. Cleary 2d 
ed. 1972) ("Most presumptions have come into existence primarily because the judges 
have believed that proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so 
probable that it is sensible and time-saving to assume the truth of fact A until the adver-
sary disproves it."). McCormick gives two additional reasons for the creation of pre-
sumptions: "to correct an imbalance resulting from one party's superior access to the 
proof' and "to avoid an impasse, to reach some result." Id. § 343, at 806-07. 
81. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 79, § 7.9, at 258. The orthodox view holds that 
once rebutting evidence has been submitted "the presumption is utterly destroyed and 
disappears ... even though the trier disbelieves the countervailing evidence." Id. 
82. See id. 
83. Where the lesser factors are involved, the trier of fact is deliberately given broad 
discretion to weigh all the circumstances surrounding the expenditure. 
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the daily operations of a PAC or independent spender, the trier 
of fact will have considerable discretion to weigh all the availa-
ble evidence. Furthermore, even if the spender's conduct is not 
typical of independent activity and thus establishes a presump-
tion of prearrangement, the spender retains the opportunity to 
come forward with evidence rebutting charges of a general intent 
to coordinate. 84 
II. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE COORDINATION PROBLEM 
Careful application of the proposed seven-part test will im-
prove enforcement of the Buckley standards, but cannot root 
out all vestiges of indirect coordination. No matter how carefully 
the relevant factors are weighed, case-by-case analysis under 
Buckley will nonetheless permit some clandestine coordination 
to go undetected.86 This section of the Note, therefore, takes a· 
different approach to the coordination problem: as a supplement 
84. Some proponents of campaign finance reform argue that PAC expenditures 
should be limited even if there is no evidence that coordination has occurred. The issue 
of whether PAC's are inherently incapable of making a truly independent expenditure 
lay at the heart of the challenge which an evenly divided Supreme Court failed to decide 
in Schmitt. See 50 U.S.L.W. 4168 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1982) (No. 80-847) (per curiam), aff'g by 
an equally divided court 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980) (three-judge court). The effect 
of the Court's ruling was to affirm the holding of the lower court that limits on indepen-
dent expenditures by PAC:'s are unconstitutional. This Note does not attempt to address 
the issue fully, although it suggests that the background to Schmitt, see supra notes 45-
56 and accompanying text, indicates a prophylactic rule limiting PAC expenditures in 
certain areas may be necessary. See infra pt. II. 
Regardless of how the Court ultimately resolves a Schmitt-type challenge to contribu-
tion regulations, the holding will be limited to PAC expenditures in publicly financed 
presidential election campaigns. Therefore, even if limits on PAC contributions were 
held constitutional, the criteria proposed in this Note would be applicable to a variety of 
contexts where'the coordination problems raised by Buckley could arise: PAC spending 
in presidential primaries and congressional races, and individual expenditures in both 
presidential and congressional campaigns. Cf. J. CEASER, REFORMING THE REFORMS 76 
(1982) (arguing that the impact of the independent expenditure loophole is greater for 
the nomination campaign than for the general election campaign because there is less 
free publicity in the primary campaign and thus added expenditures make a larger dif-
ference). Should the Court agree with the circuit court in Schmitt that limits on PAC 
spending in publicly financed presidential campaigns are unconstitutional, however, 
there clearly would be an urgent need to improve the definition of "coordination" in a 
manner consonant with the Buckley guidelines: For general discussion of the constitu-
tionality of PAC spending limits, see Note, T-he Constitutioriality of Regulating Inde-
pendent Expenditure Committees in Publicly Funded Presidential Campaigns, 18 
HARV. J. ON LEGJS. 679 (1981); Comment, Independent Political Committees and the 
Federal Election Laws, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1981). 
85. See e.g., supra note 70 and accompanying text. It is difficult, for instance, to 
regulate informal socializing between independent spenders and members of the official 
campaign staff. See Clagett & Bolton, supra note 34, at 1361-62. 
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to the seven-part test, it suggests prophylactic legislation 
designed to regulate the activities of independent advocates in 
one area of the electoral forum. 
The proposed legislation attempts to equalize access to politi-
cal advertising time on television and radio. This focus on the 
electronic media is warranted because the probability of coordi-
nation is particularly great where the broadcast media are in-
volved. By equalizing access to the electronic media, the pro-
posed legislation attacks the .source of the coordination problem 
in an area of the electoral forum where prearranged activities 
are most likely to occur. As a general matter, clandestine coordi-
nation increases in proportion to the influence wielded by a PAC 
or individual spender.86 The wealthier and more powerful the 
spender, the greater the candidate's incentive to exploit the 
spender's resources. Such exploitation, in turn, induces coordi-
nation between candidate and spender. This pattern is reflected 
most dramatically with regard to spending for radio and televi-
sion time; the high cost87 and effectiveness88 of electronic media 
advertising, coupled with its generally pervasive use as a cam-
86. There are two reasons for the cause and effect relationship between undue influ-
ence and coordination. First, an independent advocate who controls sizable amounts of 
broadcast time is more likely to command the attention of the candidate. See supra 
notes 70-74 and accompanying text. It is inconceivable that a shrewd candidate will not 
take careful stock of a PAC or individual influential in shaping public opinion. Second, 
an advocate who dominates the media has great value to a candidate. By coordinating 
activities with the advocate, the candidate can turn a large block of broadcast time to his 
own best advantage. The candidate will have great incentive to transform the indepen-
dent activities of a powerful advocate into a "shadow campaign." Indeed, the very fact 
that th.e independent spender can command so much broadcast time means the candi-
date cannot afford to have the wrong message presented to the public. The authorized 
committee will be sorely tempted to work with the advocate to ensure that the "indepen-
dent" campaign does not focus on issues which could cause. a blacklash vote. 
87. See H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION 458 (1979) (noting that in the 
1976 election one minute of prime-time advertising on a national network cost as much 
as $120,000). · 
88. See id. at 373 (arguing that "[t]he strict limitations on campaign spending greatly 
enhanced the importance of broadcast advertising, particularly television, which was 
considered to be the most efficient method of reaching large numbers of voters"); Patter-
son & McClure, Television and the Less-Interested Voter: The Costs of an Informed 
Electorate, 425 ANNALS 88 (1976) (contending that while television news has little effect 
on the disinterested voter, high-cost televised political advertisements are extremely suc-
cessful in reaching all voters); Wick, The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and 
Political Broadcast Reform, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 582, 582-83 (1973). The critical impor-
tance of electronic media advertising to the overall campaign is reflected in the percent-
age of the campaign budget spent on television and radio advertising: in 1976, 34% of 
the Democratic Party budget and 53% of the Republican Party budget was devoted to 
electronic media advertising. See H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION 373, 411 
(1979). 
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paign tool,89 has made those PAC's and individuals capable of 
purchasing sizable amounts of airtime and dominating the me-
dia particularly susceptible to exploitation.90 Thus, while it can-
not solve all aspects of the coordination problem, legislation 
designed to mitigate imbalances in the purchase of political ad-
vertising time· will help to lessen significantly the incentive to 
coordinate indirectly. 
Moreover, accepting the need for prophylactic legislation, a 
stronger constitutional argument can be made for regulating the 
activities of independent spenders if the legislation is confined 
to the purchase of political advertising time on television and 
radio. Although the Buckley Court rejected the use of prophy-
lactic legislation to limit independent activity in candidate cam-
paigns, it specifically limited its holding to cases not involving 
the broadcast media. 91 
A. The Red Lion Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has frowned on the use of government re-
strictions to equalize voices in the public forum. In Buckley, the 
Court flatly rejected the notion that government can limit "the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others,"92 finding such a concept "wholly foreign 
to the First Amendment. "93 A separate series of cases, however, 
89. See Wick, supra note 88, at 585 (noting that the high cost of television campaign-
ing is detrimental because it results in successful candidates owing political debts to 
their backers which "can be paid off only at the expense of the public"). 
90. See supra note 88. If an official campaign successfully coordinated purchases of 
television and radio advertising time with a PAC, that portion of the campaign budget 
which would have been spent for electronic media advertising would be freed for making 
additional purchases of broadcast time or for use elsewhere. 
91. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
92. 424 U.S. at 48-49. The Court reasoned further that expenditure limits did not 
advance the first amendment ideal of securing " 'the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources,' [and the] 'unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' " Id. at 
49 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 
(1945)); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 ("The First Amendment's protection against 
governmental abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a 
person's financial ability to engage in public discussion."). See generally Nicholson, 
supra note 34, at 331-33 (stressing the Burger Court's refusal to concern itself with 
wealth discrimination). 
93: 424 U.S. at 49. The "equalization rationale" was one of three arguments advanced 
by the respondents in Buckley to justify contribution and expenditure limits. The second 
rationale for limiting campaign spending - preventing corruption, real or perceived, in 
the electoral process - was found to be a compelling government interest which justified 
restraints on first amendment activity.. In contrast, the Court refused to accept as com-
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based on Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,94 suggests that the 
Court will give weight to an "equalization rationale" if broadcast 
media are involved. 911 · 
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's fairness 
doctrine96 and personal attack rules97 against first amendment 
challenges brought by broadcasters. Emphasizing the scarcity of 
television and radio frequencies as a justification for congres-
sional regulation,98 the Court reasoned that although broadcast-
pelling the government interest in controlling the skyrocketing cost of campaign financ-
ing. Id. at 29. 
Some commentators have characterized the Supreme Court's rejection of the equaliza-
tion rationale as poorly reasoned and unsupported by precedent. The two opinions upon 
which the Court relied primarily, Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966), and Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), held only that the equality principle 
cannot override first amendment protections afforded to the press. See Leventhal, supra 
note 35, at 369. For a different but related critique of the Buckley approach, see 
Adamany, supra note 35, at 586 n.135 (arguing that the Court's logic in distinguishing 
actual and apparent corruption confuses its own rationale in the absence of a full con-
gressional record of corruption). See generally supra note 35. 
94. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). For general discussion of the background to Red Lion, see 
Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars in 
the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. C1N. L. REV. 447 (1968); Robinson, The FCC and the 
First Amendment: Observatiol'IS on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 
MINN. L. REV. 67 (1967). 
95. The Buckley Court expressly limited its discussion of the equalization rationale 
so as not to include Red Lion. "Red Lion 'makes clear that the broadcast media pose 
unique and special problems not present in the traditional free speech case' .... " 424 
U.S. at 49 n.55 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); 
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388). 
96. Under the fairness doctrine, a broadcaster has an affirmative obligation to present 
contrasting views on all controversial issues concerning the public interest. Political 
Broadcast Primer, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2226 (1978). The fairness doctrine requires only 
that the broadcaster offer "a reasonable balance" in its programming; the doctrine does 
not require the broadcaster to provide representatives of opposing viewpoints equal time. 
Depending on the circumstances of an individual case, one-third, one-fifth, or one-sev-
enth time may satisfy the "reasonable balance" standard. 
97. The personal attack rules require a broadcaster to give "reasonable" response 
time to any individual who is the subject of an attack upon his "honesty, character, 
integrity or like personal qualities" during the presentation of views "on a controversial 
public issue" by any person over the licensee's station. Id. at 2225. 
98. In Red Lion and CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the 
Court clearly differentiated broadcast from print media: "differences in the characteris-
tics of news media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to 
them." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386. "[B]roadcast media pose unique and special problems 
not present in the traditional free speech case . . . . [B]roadcasting is subject to an in-
herent physical limitation." CBS, Inc., 412 U.S. at 101. 
Scarcity in the broadcast medium distinguishes the Court's ruling in Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). There, the Court held that a Florida 
statute granting a limited right of reply to candidates attacked in newspapers violated 
the first amendment. 
Critics of the fairness doctrine argue that the advent of cable television renders this 
distinction moot. See generally Simmons, The Fairness Doctrine and Cable TV, 11 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 629 (1974) (arguing that the abundance of channels provided by cable 
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ers are licensed to use the airwaves, their role as a "proxy or 
fiduciary" for the community requires them to serve the public 
interest: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the 
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. "99 By preserving 
"an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail,"100 broadcast regulations serve a compelling gov-
ernment interest which outweighs broadcasters' claims of in-
fringement on first amendment rights.101 
Through statutory amendments and federal rules, Congress 
and the FCC have tailored media-access rights to conform with 
the guidelines set forth in Red Lion. Section 315(a) of the Com-
munications Act of 1934 requires a broadcaster who has sold 
time to one candidate for federal office to offer "equal opportu-
television undercuts the scarcity argument used by the Red Lion Court to support the 
fairness doctrine). This reliance on cable television, however, is vulnerable on two 
grounds. First, it is not clear that the new technology will reach a majority of viewers. 
Second, there is no assurance that the same few broadcasters who control access to the 
three commercial stations will not also purchase the rights to cable. For a discussion of 
electronic and print media access, see Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Ac-
cess: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(1976). 
99. 395 U.S. at 390. 
100. Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated 
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
101. In a recent decision, CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981), the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed Red Lion, holding that it was constitutional for the FCC to revoke the 
license of a broadcasting station for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access 
to the station by a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office. The Court con-
cluded that the FCC's practice of independently determining whether "reasonable ac-
cess" had been granted did not impair the broadcaster's editorial discretion. Id. at 2827. 
The Court reaffirmed that the broadcaster's role as public trustee " 'is burdened by en-
forceable public obligations'," id. at 2829 (quoting Office of Communication of the 
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966)), including the right 
of the government to require" 'a licensee to share his frequency with others'," 101 S. Ct. 
at 2829 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389). The Court also reiterated the essential 
premise of Red Lion that the first amendment rights of the viewers and listeners, not the 
broadcasters, are "paramount." 101 S.Ct. at 2829. The Court noted that" 'it is of partic-
ular importance that candidates have the ... opportunity to make their views known so 
that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their 
positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day'." Id. at 2830 
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52-53). 
Prior to CBS, Inc. v. FCC, the Court appeared to retreat from Red Lion in CBS, Inc. v. 
Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), ruling that it was not unconstitutional for a 
broadcaster to refuse to sell editorial advertising time. The Court, however, stressed that 
its holding was not intended to overturn_ the fairness doctrine. See id. at 127. The deci-
sion stemmed largely from the Court's concern that the remedy sought by the plaintiff 
Democratic National Committee was a broad right of access that inevitably would in-
volve the government too deeply in the activities of broadcasters. Id. at 130-32. The 
majority noted that should the FCC or Congress at some future date devise "some kind 
of limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable," the Court might be 
inclined to rule differently. Id. at 131. 
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nities" to others running for the same office.102 "Equal opportu-
nities" is a strict standard, requiring the broadcaster to provide, 
upon request, an equal amount of time at the same cost and 
during an equivalent time period.103 While section 315(a) applies 
only to federal candidate appearances, the FCC has extended 
the "equal opportunities" principle to broadcasters who sell time 
to spokesmen or supporters of a candidate, including indepen-
dent spenders.10• The strict mandate of "equal opportunities" 
does not, however, require a broadcaster selling time to support-
102. The statute provides: 
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for 
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportuni-
ties to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting 
station: Provided, . . . [n]o obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any 
licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate . . .. Nothing in 
the foregoing . . . shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection 
with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and 
on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them 
under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable 
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public 
importance. 
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). Section 315(a) requires only that "equal opportunities" be 
given to a federal candidate appearing in person. See generally CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. 
Ct. 2813 (1981). 
103. The time of day is more important than the length of the time period in deter-
mining the effectiveness of the response. A prime-time audience is far larger than that 
which could be reached during off-peak hours. Thus, two minutes of prime time might be 
the equivalent of thirty minutes late at night. "Equal time," therefore, does not necessa-
rily require precisely the same length of time. 
104. See Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970). The extension of § 315(a) to in-
clude supporters of a candidate is commonly termed the Zapple doctrine. The FCC in-
sists it has not extended the scope of § 315(a), but merely is "appl[ying] the fairness 
doctrine in a special way so that it becomes much the same as 'equal opportunities'. " 
Political Broadcast Primer, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2226 (1978). The Supreme Court in Red 
Lion recognized that if the fairness doctrine were not applied to candidates' supporters, 
circumvention of the provision would result: 
The [equal opportunities] section applies only to campaign appearances by can-
didates, and not by family, friends, campaign managers, or other supporters. 
Without the fairness doctrine, then, a licensee could ban all campaign appear-
ances by candidates themselves from the air and proceed to deliver over his sta-
tion entirely to the supporters of one slate of candidates, to the exclusion of all 
others. In this way the broadcaster could have a far greater impact on the fa-
vored candidacy than he could by simply allowing a spot appearance by the can-
didate himself. 
395 U.S. at 382-83 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court reasoned that apply-
ing the general principles of the fairness doctrine would prevent circumvention. The 
FCC has in effect acted on the Court's suggestion. 
The Zapple doctrine, however, only applies when an initial sale has already been made 
voluntarily to one group of supporters. A broadcaster is free to deny access to all sup-
porters if he chooses. See generally Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970). But cf. CBS, Inc. v. 
FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981) (federal candidates must have reasonable access even if an 
initial sale has not been made to an opposing candidate). 
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ers of one candidate to provide free time to backers of a compet-
ing candidate who are unable to pay for the broadcast. 1011 
A major problem with the law as it presently stands is its fail-
ure to extend "equal opportunities" to situations where spokes-
men or supporters of a candidate cannot raise the funds to 
broadcast a response to an official campaign advertisement. Of-
fering to sell radio or television time does little to further the 
policy goals behind the "equal opportunities" standard if the 
supporters of a candidate lack the resources to purchase that 
time.106 In many instances, it is unlikely that spokesmen for a 
given candidate will be able to match the sums which powerful, 
105. Under the Cullman doctrine (a corollary of the fairness doctrine), a broadcaster 
is required to offer responsible spokesmen free time if no alternative means exists of 
providing balance on a controversial issue. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 
(1963). In Cullman, the FCC stated: 
[l]t is clear that the public's paramount right to hear opposing views on contro-
versial issues of public importance cannot be nullified by . . . the inability of the 
licensee to obtain paid sponsorship of the broadcast time . . . . [The broad-
caster] cannot reject a presentation otherwise suitable to the licensee - and 
thus leave the public uninformed - on the ground that he cannot obtain paid 
sponsorship for that presentation. 
Id. at 577 (emphasis added). Broadcasters have objected to the Cullman doctrine on the 
ground that citizen groups tend to spend their money on nonbroadcast media and use 
Cullman to obtain free radio and television time. See R. MASTRO, D. CosTLAW & H. 
SANCHEZ, TAKING THE INITIATIVE: CORPORATE CONTROL OF THE REFERENDUM PROCESS AND 
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 27 (Media Access Project 1980); cf. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 
1, 32 (1974) (noting the objections of some parties to the Cullman principle). Neverthe-
less, the FCC has stood by the Cullman doctrine, holding that "it is more important . . . 
that the public have an opportunity to receive contrasting views ... than that the Cull-
man principle be abandoned because of the possible practices of a few parties." Id. at 33. 
Section 315(a), however, does not require adherence to the Cullman doctrine. In 
Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970), the FCC concluded that as a "general proposi-
tion" the public's right to know should not be defeated by the lack of paid sponsorship, 
but observed that this proposition should "not have applicability in the direct political 
arena." Id. at 708. The Commission reasoned that requiring broadcasters to subsidize 
purchases of airtime by an official campaign or its supporters would constitute an "un-
warranted intrusion" of the fairness doctrine into campaign financing. Id. at 708. 
106. For discussion of the policy goals underlying Red Lion, see supra notes 98-101 
and accompanying text. Given that the Red Lion Court upheld the policy rationales un-
derlying both the fairness doctrine and § 315(a) of the Federal Communications Act of 
1934, see supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text, it is surprising that the FCC has 
chosen to apply the Cullman doctrine only to· the former. 
The campaign laws as structured present two additional problems related to the issue 
of whether supporters of a candidate are truly given "equal opportunity" to respond to 
expenditures made by supporters of another candidate. First, the laws fail to extend 
"equal opportunities" to candidates who cannot afford to buy time in response to televi-
sion appearances by an opposing candidate. Second, the laws provide "equal opportuni-
ties" only to supporters of a "victimized" candidate - and not to the candidate himself 
- if the initial purchase of advertising time was by supporters of the opposing candi-
date. See Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970). These shortcomings, however, are not 
related to the specific problem of coordination between candidates and independent 
spenders, and thus lie outside the scope of this Note. 
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well-organized national PAC's pour into television advertising.107 
In short, by failing to provide free response time, section 315(a) 
is an ineffective guarantor of "equal opportunities." 
This failure to provide free time has permitted wealthy inde-
pendent spenders to gain undue influence in candidate cam-
paigns, thus. increasing the likelihood for indirect coordination 
between spender and candidate. One way to lessen the impetus 
for coordination, therefore, would be to amend existing political 
broadcast law to guarantee spokesmen and supporters of all can-
didates free equal-response time. The proposed legislation 
should require a broadcaster to provide supporters of a candi-
date for federal office with free, equal-response time - if they 
cannot finance a response - whenever air time has been sold to 
an individual or committee making an independent expenditure 
against that candidate. 108 
107. In 1978, total PAC expenditures reached $77.8 million. Adamany, supra note 35, 
at 588. Experts predict that the potential for PAC expansion in the business sector re-
mains enormous. Id. at 589. Given the untapped potential of Fortune-500 businesses, id., 
it is difficult to imagine a spokesman for a candidate matching the collective financial 
strength of well-organized PAC's. Although independent expenditur~s constituted only a 
small portion of total PAC expenditures made during the 1980 campaign, see supra note 
10, the $77.8 million figure reflects the commitment businesses have made - and likely 
will continue to make - to finance electoral politics. 
The potential for e~pansion of PAC spending far exceeds any potential increase in 
campaign costs; indeed most presidential candidates elect to receive federal election 
funding, which carries a legally imposed limit on spending. Even those candidates with · 
wealthy backers, such as Ronald Reagan in 1980, choose to receive federal funding. 
108. Supporters of a candidate who could afford to purchase time would still be re-
quired to do so, and a showing of need would be required before any awards of free time 
would be given. If, for example, a spender could afford to purchase only one-fourth of 
the response time, the broadcaster would be required to make up the difference between 
the spender's resources and equal time. 
It is best left to Congress to establish precise eligibility criteria for determining which 
supporters qualify as needy. One way to ascertain eligibility, however, would be to ex-
amine the spender's "bank balance"; if paying for equal time would leave the supporter 
without operating funds, free time would be provided. A spender engaged in a national 
advertising campaign would not be required to deplete all its funds across the country 
before receiving free time to respond to advertisements broadcast in only one state. In 
this instance, the starting point for assessing the supporter's "bank balance" would be 
the percentage of its total funds corresponding to the state's relative electoral size. Fur-
thermore, before a national supporter would be provided free time, local or other na-
tional PAC's supporting the candidate would have to be found incapable of purchasing 
advertising time. The FCC would be responsible for ensuring that the broadcaster prop-
erly administered a "needs" test, just as the Commission presently oversees administra-
tion of the fairness doctrine. 
Free-time principles have been discussed previously by commentators. See, e.g., 
Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The Constitu-
tionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L. REV. 389, 480-81 
(1973) (discussing a 1969 proposal for providing free time in federal elections); Nichol-
son, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REv. 815, 852 (1974) (en-
dorsing free time as constitutional). The uniqueness of this Note, however, lies in pro-
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B. Constitutionality of the Free-Time Proposal 
A free-time proposal raises two pressing constitutional issues. 
First, it is arguable that broadcast requirements infringe uncon-
stitutionally upon the first amendment rights of broadcasters. 
Second, a free-time proposal may impinge unduly on the first 
amendment rights of individuals or committees wishing to make 
independent expenditures, because it may discourage broadcast-
ers from accepting independent spenders' advertisements. 
1. First amendment rights of broadcasters- The free-time 
proposal can be criticized on the grounds that requiring broad-
casters to offer advertising time to opposing speakers who are 
unable to pay exceeds the permissible scope of restrictions on 
first amendment interests, as established in Red Lion. Under 
this view, Congress may regulate licensees to ensure a balanced 
debate of public issues over the airwaves, but it may not unduly 
circumscribe broadcasters' editorial discretion.109 The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held, however, that first amendment rights 
of political association and freedom of speech are not absolute. 
Government restrictions on the speech of a private person will 
be sustained if the government can show that the regulation is a 
"precisely drawn means of serving a compelling government 
interest."110 
The proposed legislation survives the first part of this test; it 
furthers three government interests that the Court has found 
compelling. First, by ensuring that PAC's and wealthy individu-
als will not monopolize the debate, the free-time proposal - like 
posing a specific free-time measure as a remedy to the coordination problem. 
109. This argument is similar to that made in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2829 
(1981). 
110. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980). A 
significant interference with protected first amendment rights "may be sustained if the 
State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to 
avoid unnecessary abridgement." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25." 'The State may prevail only 
upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,' " First Nat'l Bank v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)), 
and "[e]ven then, the State must employ means 'closely drawn to avoid unnecessary 
abridgement.'" Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). 
Cases involving television and radio provide no exception to this general principle. The 
Court has stated: 
Th[e] role of the Government as an 'overseer' and ultimate arbiter and guardian 
of the public interest and the role of the licensee as a journalistic 'free agent' call 
for a delicate balancing of competing interests ... [requiring] both the regula-
tors and the licensees to walk a 'tightrope' to preserve the First Amendment 
values written into the . . . Communications Act. 
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2829 (1981) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973)). 
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tl;ie fairness doctrine upheld in Red Lion - enlarges the scope of 
public debate. m Although requiring broadcasters to provide free 
.response time could lead to higher advertising rates112 and thus 
lessen "the volume of ... coverage of public issues,"118 the Red 
Lion Court was concerned less with increasing the sheer volume 
of speech than with expanding the diversity of views ex-
pressed. 114 By removing financial barriers for less wealthy sup-
porters of federal candidates, the free-time proposal protects the 
breadth of the public debate. m A second government interest 
promoted by the proposed legislation is the furtherance of an 
informed public - a government interest found compelling in 
CBS, Inc. v. FCC. 116 Like the access provisions upheld in CBS, 
the free-time proposal "enhance[s] the ability of candidates to 
present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the 
effective operation of the democratic process."117 Finally, by les-
sening the danger of coordination, the proposed legislation fur-
thers a government interest recognized as compelling in Buck-
ley: protection of the integrity of the electoral process. 118 
A free-time requirement would not impinge on first amend-
111. "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .... " Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. 
"[T]he presumed effect of the fairness doctrine is one of 'enhancing the volume and 
quality of coverage' of public issues." Buc_kley, 424 U.S. at 49 n.55 (quoting Red Lion, 
395 U.S. at 393). 
112. The argument holds that requiring a grant of free time to parties victimized by 
independent spending campaigns will force broadcasters to double advertising rates to 
make up for lost revenue. As a result, independent advocates would be able to purchase 
less time. 
113. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 n.55. 
114. "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." 395 U.S. at 390; see 
also supra note 111; supra note 96 (purpose of fairness doctrine is to provide a "reasona-
ble balance" of views). 
115. Preserving the breadth of the public debate serves an additional and related 
government interest found compelling in Red Lion: protection against monopolization of 
the market of ideas by a private licensee. "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas . . . rather than to countenance monopoli-
zation of that market .... " 395 U.S. at 390. 
Nevertheless, it could be contended that the loss of revenue by the broadcaster consti-
tutes a taking of property without due process of law, in violation of the fifth amend-
ment, U.S. CONST. amend. 5. This argument, however, has been rejected by the Supreme 
Court on the ground that licensees of stations do not have a property interest in the 
channels. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radi~ Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); see also 
Barrow, supra note 94, at 538 n.299. One proponent of free time has suggested that the 
lost-revenue problem can be avoided by providing government compensation through tax 
subsidies. Id. at 538-39. 
116. 101 S.Ct. 2813 (1981). 
117. Id. at 2830. 
118. See 424 U.S. at 26-27. 
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ment rights of broadcasters to a greater degree than the Su-
preme Court has already permitted in other decisions. The pro-
posed statute represents merely a logical extension to section 
315(a) of the fairness principles upheld in Red Lion. Under the 
Cullman rule119 - a corollary of the fairness doctrine - a 
broadcaster is required to offer responsible spokesmen free time 
if there is no other way to provide balanced debate on a contro-
versial issue. Similarly, by providing free time to supporters of 
federal candidates who cannot afford response time, the pro-
posed legislation ensures that fairness principles are fully ap-
plied to section 315(a).120 
Indeed, not only is the proposed statute no more intrusive on 
first amendment rights than the statute upheld in Red Lion, hut 
in one respect, it is less intrusive. The fairness doctrine requires 
the broadcaster to provide a balanced presentation of all contro-
versial issues.121 The free-time proposal, however, is more nar-
rowly drawn, requiring a broadcaster to offer response time only 
when an independent expenditure has been made by an individ-
ual or a committee against a specific candidate. 
Furthermore, the free-time statute intrudes less on the first 
amendment interests of broadcasters than the access provisions 
upheld in CBS, Inc. v. FCC. 122 The equal access statute at issue 
in CBS imposed on broadcasters an obligation to make reasona-
ble amounts of time available for sale to all candidates in all 
campaigns, regardless of whether an opposing candidate pur-
chased time.123 The free-time proposal, in contrast, does not re-
quire that time be offered to all candidates; the broadcaster 
need only grant free time to the candidate who has been the 
target of the independent expenditure. 
2. First amendment rights_ of independent spenders-
119. See supra note 105. 
120. See Barrow, supra note 94, at 530-39 (arguing that the original purpose of the 
equal opportunities doctrine, § 315(a), was to apply the fairness concept to political cam-
paigns; thus expanding § 315(a) to provide free time would be consistent with congres-
sional intent); see also N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1982, at 12, col. 5 (midw. ed.) (quoting the 
FCC Broadcast Bureau as advising the National Conservative Political Action Commit-
tee that "its advertisements, when broadcast outside campaign periods, may subject 
broadcasters to Fairness Doctrine obligations including, under the Cullman Doctrine, 
free response time if paid sponsorship is unavailable"). While the constitutionality of § 
315(a) in its present form has never been challenged, the Red Lion Court implied that it 
stood on firm constitutional ground, equating it for purposes of "constitutional princi-
ple" with the fairness doctrine. 395 U.S. at 391; see also Barrow, supra note 94, at 530 
(reasoning that the equal opportunities doctrine is constitutional). 
121. See supra note 96. 
122. 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981). 
123. Id. at 2823. 
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Awarding free time may have a chilling effect on the first 
amendment rights of independent spenders. A radio or televi-
sion broadcaster will arguably be less likely to sell advertising 
time if it stands to lose equal amounts of time without compen-
sation. A similar argument against regulation of the electronic 
media, however, has already been rejected by the Supreme 
Court. In Red Lion, the broadcasters contended that the fairness 
doctrine and personal attack rules would result in self-censor-
ship and a diminution in the coverage of controversial public is-
sues.124 The Court responded that this result was "at best specu-
lative,"1211 and observed that the FCC was fully empowered to 
enforce the doctrine if broadcasters refused to follow fairness 
principles.126 The same response applies to the argllinent that a 
free-time proposal would limit first amendment opportunities 
for PAC's or other campaign spenders. No evidence exists that 
broadcasters would refuse to air advertisements paid for by in-
dependent spenders.127 Moreover, if the FCC determined that 
the first amendment rights of independent spenders had been 
infringed, enforcement measures against broadcasters could be 
initiated. 
It might be argued, however, that the potential loss of revenue 
for broadcasters distinguishes the free-time proposal from the 
fairness doctrine, because the danger of self-censorship is likely 
to be less "speculative"126 where government regulation has the 
effect of diminishing income. Yet this distinction is flawed; 
under the Cullman corollary to the fairness doctrine, broadcast-
ers also face a loss of revenue if responsible paying spokesmen 
cannot be found.129 Moreover, even if the free-time proposal 
does tend to increase self-censorship of broadcasters, and thus 
124. See 395 U.S. at 392-93. 
125. Id. at 393. 
126. See id. at 393-94. 
127. The FCC allows broadcasters to omit from their hourly commercial limits all 
political broadcasts which are not spot announcements. In addition, they may carry ad-
ditional advertising when there is high political demand. Consequently, during a cam-
paign, political advertising fills time that could not otherwise find commercial purchas-
ers; in effect, the broadcaster receives a windfall profit. There is little reason to believe, 
therefore, that free time requirements would force a broadcaster to refuse time to an 
independent advocate. 
In many instances, refusals to air advertisements have resulted from broadcasters' ob-
jections to content, rather than from financial considerations. Thus, a free-time statute 
may have no bearing upon a broadcaster's refusal to sell political advertising time. See 
Roberts, Conservatives' Targets Battle Back, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1982, at Alb, col. 3 
(11 of 25 stations approached by NCPAC in preparation for the 1982 elections refused to 
run their commercials for fear of being subject to libel actions). 
128. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393. 
129. See supra note 105. 
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encroach on first amendment rights of independent spenders, 
the legislation is justified by the compelling government inter-
ests discussed earlier.130 
An additional constitutional objection to the proposed free-
time legislation could be made on the grounds of overbreadth. 
The proposed statute, it might be argued, serves a compelling 
government interest, 131 but operates only by fashioning an 
overly broad prophylactic rule potentially affecting all indepen-
dent spenders. The free-time proposal, however, survives the 
"least drastic means" test historically employed by the Court to 
determine whether a regulation constitutes a precisely drawn 
means of serving a compelling government interest. 132 The pro-
posed legislation is carefully designed to regulate only one seg-
ment of the political forum - the electronic media. Independent 
spenders remain free to purchase unlimited advertising space in 
print media without worrying about their opponent receiving 
"reply time."133 Furthermore, the free-time requirement would 
not restrict the amount of television or radio advertising time · 
that the independent spender could purchase. Thus, a PAC or 
individual would not be prohibited from presenting its views 
through the electronic media to the public. Finally, the fact that 
the problems posed by indirect communication would necessi-
tate a legislative solution in itself tends to discount the over-
breadth argument; the adoption of prophylactic rules indicates 
that less drastic means for addressing the coordination problem 
- such as the Buckley test - have proved inadequate.134 
130. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text. 
Arguably, independent spenders will be less inclined to purchase advertising time if 
they risk providing opponents with an equal amount of free time. See Nicholas Zapple, 
23 F.C.C.2d 707, 708 (1970). Yet, an independent spender who decides not to purchase 
time in order to avoid "subsidizing" supporters of opposing candidates is merely exercis-
ing discretion on matters involving campaign strategy. It would be anomalous to find a 
chilling effect upon the first amendment rights of independent spenders where the only 
real effect of the regulations is to provide another party with an equal opportunity to 
speak. 
131. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
132. For discussion of overbreadth and "least drastic means," see W. LocKHART, Y. 
KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 730-38 (5th ed. 1980). See generally Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Lovell v. Griffin, 
303 U.S. 444 (1939). 
133. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding a 
state statute granting candidates the right to respond to newspaper attacks violative of 
the first amendment). 
134. Equalizing access is not the only way to ensure that wealthy independent spend-
ers do not gain undue influence. A second possible solution would be to limit the amount 
of broadcast time that may be sold to supporters of a candidate. 
The Court is likely to disallow a broad limit on all sales of broadcast time; the Buckley 
decision leaves little room for limits of any kind on individual independent expenditures 
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CONCLUSION 
The Buckley Court's failure to define clearly the line separat-
in a candidate campaign. Expenditures by corporate PAC's, however, may be a different 
matter. In First Nat'! Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Court found an outright 
ban on corporate contributions and expenditures in a ballot issue campaign to be an 
unconstitutional intrusion upon first amendment rights. Yet the Court noted carefully 
that "if appellee's arguments [had been] supported by record or legislative findings that 
corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes," the out-. 
come might have been reversed. Id. at 789-90. Thus, if it could be convincingly demon-
strated that corporate advocacy was "drowning out" opposing viewpoints, limits on ex: 
penditures by corporations and corporate PAC's for purchase of political broadcast time 
might be found constitutional; 
Since the Bellotti ruling in 1978, four new studies have indicated that corporate advo-
cacy may indeed be "drowning out" the opposition. These studies suggest that an extra-
ordinarily high correlation exists between corporate spending on grassroots lobbying and 
success at the polls in referenda campaigns for the corporate-backed side. Professor John 
Shockley was the first to make a systematic study of corporate spending. See J. Shock-
ley, Corporate Spending in the Wake of the Bellotti Decision: National Implications 
(presented to the American Political Science Association Convention, New York City, 
1978) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). The first part of his study focused on 
spending levels and shifts in voter opinion in twelve nuclear power and bottle initiative 
campaigns. In at least 5 of the 12 referendum elections, early opinion polls showed sub-
stantial support for the measures, b~t on election day 9 of the 12 initiatives were de-
feated. Id. at 9. Shockley concluded that massive corporate expenditures had influenced, 
"if not bought," public opinion, and that the democratic process had been "managed, if 
not corrupted." Id. at 4. Corporate expenditures perverted the process in several ways. 
First, money determined which initiatives became controversial. Second, money permit-
ted the corporate-backed side to define the issues and set the terms of the debate, which 
in turn frequently affected the quality of the debate. Id. at 5, 6, 11-12. 
The second half of Shockley's study focused on a Colorado state tax-reform initiative. 
Shockley concluded that the measure was "a clear example of well-spent money com-
pletely turning around a tax reform package." Id. at 22. Polls indicated that corporate 
advertisements strongly influenced voter opinion. Id. at 13. 
A second study, carried out by the Media .Access Project ("MAP"), analyzed three 
Colorado initiative campaigns. See R. MASTRO, D. CosTLAW & H. SANCHEZ, supra note 
105. In each of the campaigns, corporate opponents of the initiative outspent proponents 
by substantial margins. Id. at 8-10. The MAP researchers stressed that the most serious 
consequence of disparity in spending was the proponents' lack of access to the broadcast 
media. Id. at 14. Poll results showed that each of the initiatives held a commanding lead 
at the beginning of the campaign and subsequently lost the lead as the campaign 
progressed. Id. at 11. The MAP study concluded that a strong correlation existed be-
tween the amount and frequency of media coverage and victory at the polls. Id. at 15-16. 
The study shied away from concluding that spending and election outcome were causally 
related, but did emphasize that the triumphant side usually had the most money and the 
best media access. 
Finally, two studies by the Council on Economic Priorities ("CEP") concluded that 
proponents of an under-financed ballot-issue campaign must rely on "favorable circum-
stances" or effective use of the FCC fairness doctrine if they are to prevail. See S. 
LYDENBERG, BANKROLLING BALLOTS: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN FINANCING STATE BALLOT 
QUESTION CAMPAIGNS (CEP Puhl. R9-1, 1979); S. Lydenberg, Bankrolling Ballots-1980 
Update: The Role of Business in Financing Ballot Question Campaigns (1980) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the Journal of Law Reform). "Favorable circumstances" 
were defined by Lydenberg as a simple, straightforward ballot question, a previously ex-
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ing independent expenditures from contributions has permitted 
circumvention of contribution limits through clandestine coordi-
nation. Without new guidelines for identifying both actual and 
effective coordination, or alternatively, without prophylactic leg-
islation designed to strike at the root cause of coordination, 
campaign finance law cannot be properly enforced. Regardless 
which proposal is adopted, the FEC or Congress must act soon. 
A representative democracy will prosper only so long as the elec-
torate retains faith in the system's ability to elect its leaders 
fairly. With each passing campaign a rising tide of independent 
expenditures threatens to erode that faith. 
-John P. Relman 
isting grassroots organization, a well-publicized prior effort to achieve a similar measure 
through the legislative process, or effective use of the FCC fairness doctrine. Id. at 86. 
Financial dominance was found to coincide with a favorable outcome at the polls in 72 % 
of the 34 ballot-issue campaigns examined. S. LYDENBERG, supra, at 1. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that corporate advocacy meets the Bellotti test 
of "threatening imminently to undermine democratic processes." 435 U.S. at 790-91. 
While the Bellotti Court limited its holding to corporate spending in referenda cam-
paigns, the conclusions which can be drawn from the studies may be applicable to candi-
date campaigns as well. The Bellotti Court was careful to note that Congress tradition-
ally has recognized the need to provide candidate campaigns with a high degree of 
protection from the dangers of corruption. See id. at 788 n.26. Logically, then, if the 
studies can be used to show that corporate advocacy threatens the integrity of the electo-
ral process in the context of a referenda campaign, they surely can be used to argue that 
corporate advocacy would pose a similar threat in the context of candidate campaigns. 
An obvious problem with imposing absolute limits on campaign spending by corporate 
PAC's is the potential for circumvention. It would be possible for large corporate PAC's 
to split into smaller PAC's to avoid an expenditure limit. One answer might be to allow 
each corporation or labor union to register only one PAC with the FEC. Before purchas-
ing broadcast time, the PAC would have to demonstrate that its funds were raised solely 
from within its own ranks. A second problem with imposing limits is that it may raise 
constitutional questions similar to those presented in Schmitt, see supra note 84. This 
proposal, however, differs from the statute at issue in Schmitt; rather than applying to 
all PAC's, the proposed limits apply only to corporate PAC's. 
For opposing views on spending limits, see Fleishman, supra note 108, at 468 (noting 
that spending limits will have the undesirable effect of discriminating in favor of incum-
bents); Nicholson, supra note 108, at 847 (arguing that limiting expenditures is unconsti-
tutional). For discussion of additional proposals aimed generally at political broadcast 
reform, see Fleishman, supra note 108, at 481 (suggesting that access to broadcasting 
media should be "scaled according to established eligibility criteria," and that "a floor of 
publicly subsidized broadcast time could be made available to non-frivolous candi-
dates"); Nicholson, supra note 108 (proposing spending limits and subsidies for the use 
of broadcast media); Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 359 (1972) (arguing that spending limits and free time are constitutional); 
Wick, supra note 88, at 620-25 (declaring that the problems involved in devising an "ac-
ceptable formula" for providing all candidates with free broadcast time are not 
insurmountable). 

